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Despite his undoubted services to Atjeh, Habib Abdur-Rahman has 
never been a candidate for the honor of pahlawan nasional (national 
hero), the title given to leaders of the later stages of Atjeh's 
long war against the Dutch (1873-1912). Habib had submitted to the 
Dutch, and when the struggle was revived a few years later, he was 
branded as a traitor who had abandoned the anti-colonial cause 
too soon.
There is a more fundamental reason, however, why it would be 
inappropriate to regard Abdur-Rahman as a hero of nationalism. His 
whole life was a testimony to Islamic internationalism. Not only 
was he responsible for reviving the historical claim of Turkish 
suzerainty over Atjeh; he also made clear time and again that he 
acknowledged no loyalty to any particular country or people but only 
to the house of Islam, of which he was an aristocrat.
Abdur-Rahman was brought up among the emigrant Hadhramaut Arabs, 
who had settled in all the ports of the Indian Ocean during the nine­
teenth century. They were primarily a trading people, whose commer­
cial and shipping links were tightest between the Red Sea, South 
India, and Singapore. From mid-century, however, European steamships 
began to destroy most of their shipping business,1 probably including 
that of HabibTs father. The Hadhramaut Arabs became small traders, 
retailers, religious teachers, and financiers. They married into 
the local aristocracy, with some of them becoming rulers and founding 
dynasties. Others became advisers and ministers.
In spite of their local ties, they retained their solidarity as 
an international community, comprising one important strand in the 
broad and multicolored belt of Islam, stretching from Constantinople 
to the Moluccas. Yet few reflected this mobility and freedom as well 
as Habib Abdur-Rahman. According to his own account Atjeh appeared 
.to be the first country in which he began to establish real roots.
Yet even his stay there was broken by two extensive foreign journeys 
and was punctuated by constant restless movement within the country. 
He needed to be honored. His visits were privileges bestowed on the 
local Muslim communities. If they failed to be appreciative, he 
invariably served notice that he would depart. His pride could not 
tolerate a setback or a slight to his honor.
His movements in the most difficult period of his life--the two 
years following his return from Turkey--are a good illustration of 
this trait. He never had any illusions that Atjeh could win a war 
with the Dutch. If the great powers proved unwilling to intervene 
on Atjeh*s behalf, the only solution would be to seek an honorable 
peace with the Dutch. Arriving in Singapore in March 1874, he set
1. L.W.C. van den Berg, Le Hadhramaut et les Colonies Arabes dans
L'Archipel Indien (Batavia: Government Printer, 1886) , pp. 148-149.
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about opening negotiations, both directly and by invoking the media­
tion of the British governor. When the Dutch refused to have any­
thing to do with him and his lack of success began to be painfully 
apparent, his recourse was to leave in November 1874 for his former 
haunts on the Malabar coast. Returning to Penang in May 1875, he 
immediately faced the same dilemma. He again found his creditors 
and benefactors losing faith as he failed to obtain satisfactory 
terms from the Dutch. After much talk of returning to India, Mecca, 
or Constantinople, Abdur-Rahman went to Kedah as a royal guest at 
the end of November 1875. When he finally returned to Penang 
three months later, he was clearly at the end of his tether. 
Reluctant as he was to return to fight a losing war, it seemed the 
only remaining way to restore his credibility and his bargaining 
power.2
One of the elements in Habib's mobility was the frequency of 
his marriages. Besides the five mentioned in his biography, he 
contracted at least one more in Singapore in August 1874--to a 
Pahang Arab woman related to Sayyid Junied.3 4 The daughters of 
sayyid* could not marry below their station, which created a con­
siderable demand for spouses of the correct lineage. Most of 
Habib's"marriages were undoubtedly of this type, making allies and 
hosts of one family of Hadhrami sayyid in the new town he was 
visiting. Only his marriage to Potjut in Atjeh appears certain to 
have been part of a different tradition, that of the Arab marrying 
into the ruling family of an Indonesian state to strengthen his 
bid for power.
None of these six wives appears ever to have travelled with 
him. While in Penang and Kedah his retinue included a concubine 
and two servants or slaves, of whom one was a Turkish Circassian.5 
Habib brought two young Circassians back with him from Constan­
tinople,6 and, according to Snouck Hurgronje, had earlier brought 
Hindu slaves to Atjeh from India.7
2. These moves are described more fully in Anthony Reid, The Contest 
for North Sumatra: Atjeh, the Netherlands, and Britain^ 1858-1898 
(Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 158-180. 
Reference should be made to this work wherever no specific source 
is given below. The ultimate sources for most of Habib's moves 
in the Straits Settlements are the full reports of the Dutch 
representatives in Penang and Singapore, both of which are 
filed in Algemeen Rijksarchief (hereafter ARA) Consulaats- 
archief, Penang, 46 and 99-102.
3. Maier to Governor-General, August 23, 1874, ARA Consulaats- 
archief, Penang, 46.
4. The term sayyid is generally used for descendants of Muhammad 
through his grandson Husain. Habib is an honorific applied 
to sayyid in Malabar and elsewhere and apparently was intro­
duced to Atjeh by Abdur-Rahman himself.
5. Lavino to Governor-General, May 27, 1875 and March 16, 1876, ARA 
Consulaats-archief, Penang, 101-102.
6. Heldewier to Gericke, December 20, 1874, ARA Kabinets-archief 
(hereafter Kol. Kab.), N*-^ dossier 6044.
7. A.W.S. O'Sullivan (trans.), C. Snouck Hurgronje's The Achehnese 
(Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906), I, 23n.
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Unlike the majority of his compatriots, Habib believed in style. 
His dress, his horse, his entourage, his bearing, all had to show 
he was a man to be respected. For solemn occasions he wore a splendid 
Turkish sword of honor. To greet the Dutch Dgambi. mission of 1871 he 
wore the Turkish Medjidie decoration which had been bestowed on 
Sultan Ibrahim twenty years earlier. In May 1875 he created a 
spectacle in Penang by the magnificent costume and richly-attired 
horse with which he paid his first visit to Lieutenant Governor 
Anson in the government house on Penang Hill.8 He believed, with 
apparent justification, that only by such a display of grandness 
could he ensure that Indonesians and colonial authorities alike would 
pay him the respect due someone of his station and office.
But this style could only be maintained by constant subventions 
from his supporters. Undoubtedly the wealth of Atjehnese pepper 
growers with their willingness to support religious causes was one 
of the attractions of Atjeh for Habib. In 1875 he told Lavino that 
he had received about $36,000 a year while in Atjeh.9 Though this 
figure is undoubtedly exaggerated, it should be compared with the 
sums he claims to have gathered to build the Great Mosque--if indeed 
he made a clear distinction between the two causes. His considerable 
expenses as envoy in Constantinople were provided mainly by Teuku 
Paja, whom the Dutch knew to have sent at least two telegraphic 
credits to Constantinople totalling $6,000. In the Straits Settle­
ments Abdur-Rahman was frequently forced to appeal to the leading*
Arab merchants or to T. Muda Njak Malim of Simpang Ulim for further 
support for his diplomatic efforts.
It is disappointing, but scarcely surprising, to find that, when 
the righteous cause of promoting Atjeh was abandoned as hopeless, 
the need for money remained. In 1875 Abdur-Rahman asked the Dutch 
for a reward of $50,000, or $500 a month for life, if he successfully 
negotiated a Dutch-Atjeh peace. This was refused. After leading 
the war effort for a time he successfully demanded twice the amount-- 
$1,000 per month for life. On this princely pension he lived 
extravagantly at Mecca. He maintained three houses and a well-pro­
vided harem there, and strove to maintain his standing by giving 
frequent lavish feasts.10
Abdur-Rahman's two essential assets were the sacredness of his 
descent from the Prophet and his religious learning. Sayyid were 
honored throughout the Muslim world but nowhere more than in Atjeh 
where a position of respect and comfort was assured even the most 
unimpressive members of the sacred lineage. The fact that Abdur- 
Rahman also had a good knowledge of Muslim law immediately established 
him as a religious leader. During his early years in Atjeh he became
8. Lavino to Governor-General, May 27, 1875, ARA Consulaats- 
archief, Penang, 101.
9. Lavino to Governor-General, June 24, 1875, ARA Consulaats- 
archief, Penang, 101. Throughout this introduction and the 
translation which follows, the currency referred to is the 
Mexican silver dollar, valued in this period at 4s. 3d. sterling.
10. De Vicq (Jidda) to Karnebeek, November 12, 1886, ARA Kol. Kab. 
Cl3, dossier 6169.
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particularly influential as an upholder of a relatively strict line 
opposing such sins against Islam as gambling,'opium smoking, and 
pederasty. Most Atjehnese were ready to admit the scandalousness 
of these common practices and to support, in principle, movements 
of reform and religious revival as long as they were pursued with 
the high degree of common sense and flexibility which Habib dis­
played.
As Snouck Hurgronje and James Siegel have both pointed out,11 
Habib Abdur-Rahman formed part of a recurring pattern of religious 
reformers who were able to bring direction to the divided Atjehnese. 
Even for the strong Sultan Ibrahim, traditional alignments and 
suspicions among the uVe'ibalang (district chief) placed severe limits 
on the ability'of the sovereign to lead his people effectively."
After 1870 the Sul'tanate was a minimal force. But a religious 
leader could appeal on the basis of a higher loyalty, by portraying 
the work to be done as a religious duty rather than a secular com­
mand. Habib's ability to exhort the Atjehnese to common effort in 
this way "was nothing short of prodigious."12 He raised enormous 
sums for mosque construction and other public works, for his elabor­
ate diplomatic ventures, and for the war. He settled feuds which 
had endured for decades and he brought a larger force of Atjehnese 
into the field against the Dutch than any of the military leaders 
after 1878.
Even though traditional respect for his birth and his learn­
ing were among Habib's greatest assets, he himself was a man of the 
modern world. When the Sultan of Serdang consulted him about the 
credentials of a certain sayyid, Abdur-Rahman's immediate response 
was an offer to telegraph Mecca.13 He appeared to be as much at 
home with European statesmen as with Atjehnese ulama (Islamic teachers 
and scholars).
Nothing could be further from the truth than van den Berg's 
claim1 * that most Europeans who met him gained the impression of 
"un §norme fanfaron." Time and again skeptical Dutch and British 
officials, to say nothing of highly-placed Turks,15 were forced
11. Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehnese, I, pp. 158-164; James Siegel, The 
Rope of God (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969),
pp. 49-51 and 60-67.
12. Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehnese, I, p. 164.
13. Lavino to Assistant Resident of Deli, August 6, 1875, and reply 
August 19, 1875, ARA Consulaats-archief, Penang, 101.
14. L.W.C. van den Berg, Le Hadhramaut, p. 200.
15. A grudging acknowledgement by the Russian Ambassador Ignatiev, 
the strongest opponent of Habib's cause in Turkey, is indicative 
of the way in which the Atjehnese envoy impressed Turkish leaders: 
"They say he is of Arab origin and very intelligent. He pos­
sesses, moreover, an education which strikes the Turkish minis­
ters quite as much as his diplomatic cast of mind." A. Guber,
G. Levinson, and V. Mazaev, eds., Politika Kapitalisticheskikh 
Derzhav i Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'noe Dvizhenie v Iugo-Vostochnoi 
Azii,(1870-1917). Dokumenty i Materialy (Moscow: The Science 
Publishing House, 1965) , I, p . 53^
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after meeting him to acknowledge his acute intelligence, political 
insight, and understanding of the Western world.
Habib’s greatest success was in Constantinople, where he was 
lionized by the pan-Islamic press and created real concern in European 
capitals that Turkey would intervene .forcefully in the war. It is 
significant, however, that his strongest supporters in Turkey were 
not the courtiers seeking to flatter the Sultan’s vanity but liberal 
reformers like Midhat Pasha who were to overthrow Abdul Aziz in favor 
of a parliamentary constitution three years later. Despite the con­
sistent pragmatism with which he had greeted Western advances before 
1873, Abdur-Rahman had to overcome a reputation in Dutch circles as 
a fanatic troublemaker after his Constantinople mission. Dutch con­
suls who met him successively in Jidda, Singapore, and Penang were 
nevertheless all won over by him. Maier in Singapore and Lavino in 
Penang, in particular, became converts to his moderate peace plans 
once they had given him a hearing.
Similarly, Habib was able to persuade one British official after 
another that British mediation was the only way to peace in Atjeh. 
After meeting him, successive Governors of the Straits Settlements,
Sir Andrew Clarke (1873-1875) and Sir William Jervois (1875-1877),- 
alarmed the Dutch with their confident insistence that Atjeh was 
prepared for peace only on the basis of British guarantees. In the 
case of Jervois, at least, there is little doubt that his meeting 
with Abdur-Rahman in Penang on June 23, 1875 changed his position 
fundamentally on the Atjeh question. Anson, the Lieutenant Governor 
of Penang, was particularly anxious to assist Habib’s efforts to bring 
about a peaceful settlement, even though he had not been notably 
sympathetic to Atjeh before the envoy’s arrival.
Habib’s success with both Atjehnese and Westerners was in large 
measure due to the direct and forceful methods he frequently used, 
in contrast to the traditional politeness of Indonesian court circles. 
Snouck Hurgronje relates16 that if Atjehnese displeased him by 
arriving very late for a meeting or addressing him in an improper 
fashion, ”he would smite, kick, or even spit upon them by way of 
correction.” He made use of the favorite Atjehnese mupakat (public 
discussion), whereby ”his weaker opponents are terrorized, while the 
stronger are flattered, and finally many are won over and even per­
suaded that they themselves were the originators of the proposed 
plan.”17 While the forceful, aggressive style which Habib adopted at 
such meetings would have been highly dangerous for most Atjehnese, in 
a foreigner as revered as Habib it was a sign of strength and 
authority.
To Europeans likewise he spoke forcefully and directly, in a 
manner which always commanded respect. His reply to Kraijenhoff’s18 
mission of ’’friendship” in 1871, when Habib was at the height of
16. Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehnese, I, p. 163,
17. Ibid., p. 76.
18. Controleur Kraijenhoff represented the Governor of Sumatra’s West 
Coast, through whom relations between Atjeh and Batavia were to 
be conducted according to the 1857 Treaty. He came on successive 
Dutch missions to Atjeh in September 1871, May 1872, and 
October 1872.
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his power in Atjeh, is a fair example:19
Atjeh lives in friendship with England, France,
Turkey, and other countries, because it is not 
injured by these powers. On the other hand,
Holland, which now wanted to tighten the bonds 
of friendship, had not refrained from periodically 
seizing states from the Atjehnese kingdom, as had 
happened only recently. What sort of friendship 
was that! He knew only one sort, namely:
Salah di larang,
Benar di ikut,
Di undju lepaskan,
Kasu karau di talong.20 21
If Holland sincerely meant well, she should 
give back what she had taken, namely Singkel, Baros,
Sibolga, and Nias, with the neighboring islands, as 
well as the petty states of the East Coast, while 
she must support the Sultan against the princes on 
those borders who wish to break away.
A later quotation, recorded by Anson's secretary in 1875,2 1 
shows Habib's style at a much more desperate moment for both him­
self and Atjeh, when he was struggling to persuade the Dutch, through 
Lavino, to accept his ultimate concession to them.
The Syed said he had now come to state for the last 
time what he was ready to do, and if the Dutch would 
not trust him he would then leave Penang. He could 
easily get to Achin [the coast of Achin was blockaded 
by eleven Dutch men-of-war], and if the Dutch Government 
would not have anything to do with him, he could go to 
Achin, and bid them fight on. The war could be 
continued for three years more. He knew in the end the 
Achinese would be beaten, but what would the Dutch get? 
a desert, all the pepper destroyed, and the country 
desolate. If peace were brought about, 1000 Dutch 
soldiers would suffice to hold Achin, and two or three 
hundred the other places. He desired peace more than 
any one, and prayed that there might be an end to the 
slaughter. He would prefer to see the country under 
the Dutch, as he would profit greatly by it. The Dutch 
would make roads and improve the country. In every way 
it was to his interest to bring about a settlement. He 
was not an Achinese. What was Achin to him? If he 
brought about a settlement would not he be a great man.
19. As summarized in E . S. de Klerck, De Atjeh-oorlog (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1912), p. 347.
20. The first two lines of the quatrain might be translated "false­
hood is forbidden; truth is upheld." The following two lines 
appear to have been wrongly copied.
21. A. E. H. Anson, About Others and Myself, 1745 to 1920 (London: 
John Murray, 1920) , pp. 326-328.
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The Dutch would highly honor him, and he would get stars 
and medals. If he wished he could go to Europe and 
entirely give up Achin. He was well known to distin­
guished statesmen. It was clear what his interests 
were, and yet the Dutch would not trust him.
As for his intentions, he had shown on several 
occasions that he intended well towards the Dutch, 
and was anxious to bring about peace. The first 
occasion was when General Kaupmann,22 just before 
the war began, consulted with him. He then fully 
explained his views and advised the General the best 
way to bring about terms. Instead of listening to 
him, they had taken up Panglima Tibang, his enemy, 
a man of no position; and then this war had begun.
He had told the General how they should proceed: at
first offering favourable conditions, and by degrees 
establishing their supremacy as the English have 
always done in India, In that way they could have 
got Achin without any bloodshed. He had proposed the 
terms for a treaty, but the Dutch, instead of follow­
ing his advice, or trusting him, had at once made war, 
thinking to conquer the place directly. Then he had 
gone to Constantinople to try to get the Turkish 
Government to intervene to stop the war, but they 
would not. He had seen the Dutch Consul at Jedda, 
and again he had shown to him how anxious he was to 
bring about terms. Failing at Constantinople, he 
had returned to Singapore, and from there had addressed 
the Governor-General, so the Dutch had plenty of op­
portunity of knowing his good intentions. It was true 
he had encouraged the Achinese to fight when the war 
had once begun, and since then, of course, he had 
assisted them, but he was none the less anxious for 
peace and an end of the slaughter.
What he now proposed was this: he would go on
board a Dutch man-of-war, and not land at all. They 
would anchor off Kloewang, and he would send for the 
leader of the Achinese. Then in the presence of a 
number of Dutch officers and surrounded by a guard, 
he would, in Malay, openly give advice to the chiefs.
In the first place, after explaining the situation, 
he would get them by word of mouth to engage to agree 
to terms. To make this more binding, he would then 
get them to agree in writing and lastly would have 
them solemnly to swear on the Koran. After that 
they could not go back, and terms could be arranged. 
Meanwhile there would be a suspension of hostilities. 
This was what he would do. He was the key by which 
the Dutch could alone enter Achin. If they threw 
away the key they could not get into the box without 
smashing it. They had thrown away the key, and had 
battered the box with a crowbar. It had made a great 
noise, but the box was not broken by it. The key was 
there, and they would not try it.
22. Colonel Koopman, of the 1871 Djambi mission.
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About the Text
This autobiography is unfortunately only second hand. It was 
written by Captain I. D. I. van der Hegge Spies, the commander of 
the Dutch warship Curacao, which carried Abdur-Rahman and his party 
from Atjeh to Jidda. During the voyage, lasting from November 24, 
1878 to January 28, 1879, the captain appears to have taken down 
the story of Habib's life as it was told to him. Although the 
manuscript he left is in third-person Dutch, it reads as though 
very little altered from notes taken directly from Habib. A copy 
of the manuscript of van der Hegge Spies was made available to me 
by James Siegel, to whom I am extremely grateful. The original 
is in the Instituut voor de Tropen, Amsterdam.
In 1880 this manuscript was used as the basis for an article 
in De Indische Gids. 23 The author, Alexander, in fact made only 
minor rewording from the manuscript, most of which takes the meaning 
still further from what Habib appears to have intended. I have 
commented in footnotes on the very few points at which Alexander 
added something to the manuscript, possibly as a result of further 
information from van der Hegge Spies.
THE TEXT IN TRANSLATION
Born in Hadhramaut (Temir) in the year 1249 [1833-1834],* 1 Habib 
went to Malabar at the age of two with his father, Muhammad Az-Zahir, 
who remarried there.2 Habid had no brothers or sisters. At the age 
of five (1837) his father sent him to Egypt to learn reading and 
writing, and at the same time to study the Koran. His education was 
later continued in Mecca.
In 1842 he returned to Malabar; next he was sent to Calicut to 
study further there. When, at the age of sixteen (1848), he had 
sufficient learning and was at home with the Koran, his father let 
him travel with one of his ships called the Yeddul Manan, not as 
master but rather as supercargo, principally to learn about trade.
23. Alexander, "Korte Levensschets van den Arabier Habib Abdoe 
'Rahman Alzahir, naar zijne eigen opgaven saamgesteld," De 
Indische Gids, 2, Part II (1880), pp. 1008-1020.
1. Spies gives the Muslim year 1249 and the Christian year 1832, 
which do not correspond. I have assumed it is the Muslim date 
which derives from Habib and have omitted what I take to be 
Spies' miscalculation. The Christian years mentioned in the 
following two paragraphs appear to be derived by Spies from 
his original miscalculation. I cannot locate Temir. Anson 
(About Others and Myself, p. 328) claims that Abdur-Rahman 
was born "in the British territory of Aden."
2. Alexander ("Korte Levensschets," p. 1009) adds that Habib's 
mother died shortly after his birth.
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After having made various voyages with this ship, visiting the 
coasts of India, Ceylon, and Arabia, Habib came to Mocha. At that 
time a daughter of the deceased ruler was living there, whose posses­
sions had been taken by others after the death of her father. Habib, 
although not knowing her personally, took her cause to heart, spoke 
and dealt in her interest, and succeeded in getting these possessions 
returned to the girl. Out of gratitude she asked him to marry her, 
having previously rejected various other claimants to her hand.
Later, when Habib was staying in Atjeh, he received news of her 
death.
After having lived at Mocha for a year and a half, he went to 
Mecca; from there to Constantinople; and then back to Malabar.
After marrying again in Malabar and staying there some months, he 
went to Calicut, where he also took a wife by whom he had a daughter 
named Sjarifa Fatima, who is still alive.
After having lived in Calicut for a couple of years he moved to 
Hyderabad, where the Hindu religion was professed.3 4 As the ruler of 
this region had no children, although he greatly desired them, Habib 
gave him a potion with the result that he saw his desire for children 
fulfilled. Habib was now able to persuade the ruler to go over to 
Islam, while the ruler, out of gratitude, appointed him Djamidar, 
or commander of 1,000 soldiers.
After having filled this position for eleven months he asked 
to be released and proceeded to Calcutta. There he appears to 
have established himself as a goldsmith, or rather as a worker in 
gold, a gilder, while at the same time he purified the raw gold 
or ore which came to the market. Whatever the real basis of this 
occupation was, it appears to have yielded great profits. Habib 
related that he earned $100 a day at it, while he lived in a villa 
called Golkat which cost $600 a month in rent.
After staying there for some years, earning and putting away a 
lot of money, the lure of travel overcame him, and particularly the 
desire to see Europe. On this journey he visited Italy, Germany, 
and France, and then returned to Mecca via Constantinople.1* Next he 
travelled through British India and visited Bombay, where he stayed 
for three months; Hyderabad, where he spent seven months; and 
Calicut, where he remained only three months.
Then he went to Singapore, where he stayed eleven months and 
got to know the Maharadja of Johor, whose service he entered for a 
salary of $2,000 a year. Habib says of Johor that there was much to
3. This probably refers to Hyderabad in the Deccan, which had a 
thriving Hadhramaut colony. Its ruler, the Nizam, had for over a 
century been a firmly Muslim as his counterpart in the other 
Hyderabad (Sind). Habib may have served in one of the Hindu 
samasthans, semi-autonomous princely domains tributary to the 
Nizam, or with one of the Hindu or Shi'ite noble families.
4. Alexander ("Korte Levensschets," p. 1010) adds that Habib was 
received with great honor in Constantinople because of his learn­
ing and birth, and then digresses to dwell upon Habib's broad­
mindedness which extended to drinking wine.
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be done at the time of his arrival. Many buildings and roads needed 
to be constructed, and the internal government also needed to be 
organized; the responsibility for all this belonged to Habib.5
After having been there about one and a half years, he asked 
the Maharadja for his release and obtained it with a written testi­
mony of satisfaction over the services he had performed. Thereupon 
he proceeded to Atjeh. On his way there he stopped at Pulau Penang 
where he stayed about a month, going from there to Pidi£ as a 
passenger on a schooner belonging to Teuku Main of Ajer Labu [IS 
LabeuS] and on to Atjeh in a sampan.
On arrival there he remained for three days in Kampung Djawa, 
and then moved to the house of Habib Mohammad Mahaldi in Kampung 
Langsepong. This took place in Djumadil Awal 12816 [October 1864]. 
The above person brought him to the Sultan, Ibrahim Mansur Shah, 
to whom he showed the testimony of the Maharadja of Johor. He was 
well received by the Sultan on the strength of this. Here, too, 
Habib married again. Meanwhile the Sultan appointed him head of 
the Great Mosque.7
At this time in Atjeh there was great confusion in the govern­
ment and much discord among the chiefs, while the authority of the
5. Habib arrived soon after the accession to the Johor throne of Abu 
Bakar (1862-1895), a modernizing ruler who introduced a number of 
educated Singapore Malays into the Johor administration. Early
in his reign Abu Bakar also brought some prominent Singapore Arabs 
into key positions in the state. Some public works did take place 
at Johor Baru during these years (1862-1864), but Habib’s claim 
to control "internal government" is certainly exaggerated. C.H.H. 
Wake, "Nineteenth Century Johor: Ruler and Realm in Transition" 
(Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1966), pp. 241-247, 
and additional information kindly supplied by Dr. Wake.
6. The Spies text gives the Muslim year 1261 (which Alexander renders 
1221) and the Christian year 1864. Since the former cannot be 
correct, I assume it is a slip of the pen for 1281. An anonymous 
Dutch source states the less likely possibility that Habib arrived 
in Atjeh from Malabar about 1283H (1866). "Aanteekeningen over
Atjehneesche aangelengenheden," Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch- 
Indie, nieuwe serie, No. 3, II (1874) , p. 40T. This source is 
primarily based on an undated memorandum on Abdur-Rahman in ARA 
Kol. Kab. e 24? dossier 6052. Langespong was about a mile upriver 
from the dalam, on the left bank in the territory of Panglima 
Meuseugit Raja. The wife Habib took here was an Arab, presumably 
a relation of Mahaldi, and she continued to live in Langespong. 
"Aanteekeningen," p. 409.
7. This position was probably a purely religious office such as the 
imam of the mosque and should not be confused with the hereditary 
Atjehnese offices of Panglima Meuseugit Raja or Kali Malik’ul 
Adil, both of which had become secular ule&balangships with juris­
diction in the neighborhood of the palace and Great Mosque, and 
had lost their original religious significance. Snouck Hurgronje, 
The Achehnese, I, p. 121.
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Sultan was greatly weakened. The Sultan consulted Habib frequently, 
as a result of which the state of affairs improved very much and 
more order was introduced to the government.
The Sultan, already having the intention to bring the succession 
back into the legitimate line after his death, wished to have Tuanku 
Mohamud [Mahmud], son of the deceased Sultan Suleiman Iskandar, near 
him in the Kraton. Mahmud was then in the hands of Teuku Muda Ba!et 
in Lamtengah.8 On a certain day the Sultan consulted Habib about 
how he might bring this about. Habib requested, and immediately 
received from the Sultan, authority to deal with this matter as cir­
cumstances demanded. The Sultan also put 2,000 men at his disposal. 
With these he went straight to the III Mukim Tjot Putu and raised 
still more men and chiefs there. His force having grown to 12,000 
men, he proceeded to Kampung Lamtengah. Close to the Kampung, on 
the near side of the river he called a halt and sent an envoy named 
Sjeich Abdul Rachman to the house of Teuku Muda Ba'et to try to 
bring Tuanku Mahmud to him.
On arrival the envoy found that Teuku Muda Bafet was not a*t 
home, and it was no trouble for him to get Tuanku Mahmud to flee with 
him to Habib. Thereupon Habib went via Tjot Putu to Pagar Ajer, 
whence he sent a messenger to the Sultan in Kota Radja to inform him. 
of the satisfactory outcome of the mission. The Sultan had several 
ulegbalang collect Tuanku Mahmud and from then onwards kept him 
close at hand.
Teuku Muda Ba’et, who was incensed that Tuanku Mahmud had been 
brought to Kota Radja refused to follow the commands of the Sultan 
as did various chiefs and uleSbalang of the three Sagi.9 Once again 
Habib requested the Sultan to give him authority to bring them to 
obedience. Having obtained this, he campaigned through the three 
Sagi with an evergrowing force, persuading the recalcitrant chiefs 
to follow him to Kota Dalam (Kraton)10 partly by force and partly
8. Both by tradition and in terms of the men he could command, the 
ulb&balang of the VII Mukim, Bafet was second only to Panglima 
Polem in the Sagi of the XXII Mukim, and one of the most power­
ful’ men in Atjeh. In the major succession dispute of 1850-1857 
between the young heir Suleiman and his uncle and erstwhile 
guardian Ibrahim (Mansur), Teuku Muda BaTet took the side of 
Suleiman. This alliance was cemented by Suleiman1s marrying 
Ba'et's sister, who was then still a child. Suleiman never 
succeeded, however, in recovering his capital, and the conflict 
ended with his death in 1857. Ba'et remained unreconciled to the 
Sultan and continued to protect Suleiman*s wife and infant son 
Mahmud, born about 1854, K.F.H. Van Langen, "De Inrichting van 
het Atjehsche Staatsbestuur onder het Sultanaat," Bijdragen tot 
de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 34 (1888), pp. 39 7-39 8; Reid, 
Contest, pp. 16 and 80.
9. The three Sagi (corners) into which all of Atjeh Besar outside 
the capital and environs was divided. They were known by the 
conventionalized number of Mukim they once held, i.e., XXV Mukim 
(west of Atjeh river), XXVI Mukim (east of Atjeh river), XXII 
Mukim (upriver).
10. Atjehnese called the royal enclosure the dalam, whereas the Dutch 
wrongly referred to it as the kraton, the term used on Java.
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by means of his fluency. He then proceeded to Lamtengah, took Teuku 
Muda Ba'et captive, and thereupon marched to the territory of Teuku 
Nanta,11 the only uleebalang who had still refused to go with Habib 
to the Sultan. Becoming fearful, this chief then joined the others 
who were coming to offer their submission to the Sultan, whereupon 
Habib returned to Kota Dalam.
In eight days time Habib had through cunning and force brought 
all uleSbalang both to the Sultan's presence and to obedience to 
their ruler. As a reward for services rendered, Habib was appointed 
by the Sultan head of religion12 and of the Great Mosque, as well as 
chief of Tjot Putu in the III Mukim.13
In order to strengthen his position in Atjeh, Habib, who was a 
foreigner, now contemplated establishing kinship ties with an influ­
ential chief through marriage. As Teuku Muda Ba'et was now with the
Kota Dalam and Kota Radja were expressions sometimes used by 
Atjehnese to refer to their capital, although Banda Atjeh Daru's- 
Salam was historically a more correct name. The Dutch adopted 
the usage Kota Radja.
11. Teuku Nanta Setia succeeded about 1848 in wresting control of VI 
Mukim near the capital which had formerly been part of the domain 
of Teuku Nek of Meura'sa. These two families remained bitter 
rivals thereafter. In the succession dispute of 1850-1857, Nek 
sided with Ibrahim while Nanta provided Suleiman with his principal 
base. Van Langen, "De Inrichting," pp. 406-408; Snouck Hurgronje, 
The Achehnese, pp. 126-127.
12. Snouck Hurgronje (The Achehnese, I, pp. 161-163) states that Habib 
was put in charge of a new court, the bale meuhakamah, created to 
enable him to try all cases according to Islamic law. Although 
such courts appear to have been instituted on earlier occasions
in Atjeh's history, their religious significance had seldom out­
lasted the ruler concerned, and most disputes were settled by 
uleSbalang according to adat. Because of his consummate political 
skill as well as his religious prestige, Habib was able to use his 
office to settle a wide range of disputes and to attack such 
acknowledged abuses as opium and gambling. Ali Bahanan, who re­
ported to the Dutch on a visit to Atjeh in 1867, noted that Abdur- 
Rahman had already made powerful enemies in his new position be­
cause of the stiff fines he imposed and his levies for mosque 
construction, not to mention the other ulama resentful of this 
newcomer. "Aanteekeningen" (pp. 405-406) suggests that the Sultan 
accepted Habib's offer to resign sometime in 1866-1867.
13. The III Mukim Keureukon was a territory on the border between the 
Sagi of the XXVI and XXII Mukim, though belonging directly to the 
Sultan rather than to either Sagi. Snouck Hurgronje,(The 
Achehnese, I, p. 124) refers to a famous ulama in Tjot Putu in
a slightly earlier period, and it may be that Habib took over the 
d§ah (religious school) which this teacher had built. The III 
Mukim Keureukon and parts of the adjoining XXVI Mukim remained 
the basis of Habib's most direct support in Atjeh Besar, although 
he was obliged to march against Tjot Putu in late 1871, when one 
of Tuanku Husein's supporters settled there. "Aanteekeningen," 
p. 411.
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Sultan in Kota Radja, after Habib’s armed expedition described above, 
Habib asked and obtained from him, for a payment of $400, his sister 
Potjut as a wife. By this marriage Habib became a considerable person 
within the Atjehnese state, for Potjut was not only the sister of 
one of the foremost chiefs but at the same time the widow of Sultan 
Suleiman Iskandar.
However, after returning to his own domain, Teuku Muda Ba’et 
refused to allow Potjut to go to Tjot Putu. At first he promised 
to let Habib have her after three months but in the end declared 
that Habib would not get her except by force. Habib, therefore, 
decided to go to Tjot Bada with a great force and compelled Teuku 
Muda BaTet to let him have Potjut, whom he now brought to Tjot Putu. 
From this point dates the friendship between Habib and Teuku Muda 
Ba’et which has continued until today.
The Sultan was exceedingly surprised at this war Habib had 
carried on with results so favorable to himself, while HabibTs 
enemies, among whom Teuku Kali14 was foremost, slandered him and 
attempted to make him suspect in the eyes of the Sultan. They said 
that Habib only waged war in order to have ever more men at his com­
mand and intended to make war on the Sultan himself. At this time, 
however, the Sultan placed no trust in these accusations.
On the contrary, Habib’s proposal to build another large mosque 
was accepted by the Sultan, who gave him authority to requisition 
the various uleSbalang and other chiefs to deliver the necessary wood, 
which was collected and sent to Penajung by Habib. Having accumulated 
a sufficient stock of timber there, Habib gave a great feast in which 
almost the whole population of Atjeh Besar, chiefs and commoners, 
took part. Thereafter a start was made on building the missigit,15
14. His full title was Teuku Kali Malikon Ade, from the Arabic Kadhi 
Maliku’l adil, meaning ’’judge of the righteous king.1’ Although in 
the seventeenth century the official with this title appears to 
have administered both Islamic and adat law, his hereditary suc­
cessors became entirely secularized, and more learned men were 
appointed to judge religious questions. In the nineteenth century 
the Kali Malikon Ade managed to acquire a fief of twelve villages 
near the capital, and thus became in almost every respect an 
uleebalang, as symbolized by his use of the title Teuku. The last 
title holder, Teuku Kali Njak Tjut (d. 1885) could neither read nor 
write, yet he was still a very important adviser to the ruler and 
presided over a council of ’’court uleebalang” who judged some 
secular questions. Van Langen, ”De Inrichting,” pp. 42-43;
Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehnese, I, pp. 97-101.
15. Atjehnese meuseugit (cf. Arabic, Masdj id), mosque. The mosque in 
question was the meuseugit raja Beit ur-Rahman, the great mosque 
of the capital, said to have been founded by Sultan Iskandar Muda 
(1607-1637). It was burned down in the reign of Nuru’l Alam 
(1675-1678) and was in very bad repair again in Habib’s time. The 
mosque reconstructed by Habib was destroyed by the Dutch in 1873, 
but. a painting purportedly of it, as recollected by Tgk. Sjeich 
Ibrahim (b. Sjeich Maraban), now hangs in the balai of the Governor 
of Atjeh. Its inscription states that it was built on Habib’s 
initiative in 1867, at a cost of $13,000. In reality, however,
the work does not appear to have been complete until 1870.
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for which $3,000 was given by the Sultan himself.
Habib went in person to visit the various petty states on the 
West Coast of Atjeh to collect money. He succeeded in getting 
$33,000 and reported this success to the Sultan.
Meanwhile, each of Habib’s absences was used to slander him 
with the Sultan. During his stay on the West Coast, for example, 
it was said that he had gone there to buy weapons, etc. Although 
the Sultan initially paid no attention to these suggestions, they 
were repeated so often that he finally began to waver in his good 
opinion of Habib--perhaps it could be true that this foreigner was 
a bad man. Habib’s enemies, jealous of his wealth, also grew in 
number. In this way his position in Atjeh became untenable.
He successfully asked for his dismissal and left from Pulau 
Penang for Mecca,16 where he received letters of recommendation 
from: (1) the Great Sherif Abdullah Basjah;17 (2) the Sherif of
Jidda, Mohamar Basja;18 and (3) his former teacher Habib Tadlak.
16. According to ’’Aanteekeningen,” pp. 406-408, Abdur-Rahman had 
attempted to leave for Jidda when he first fell into the 
Sultan’s disfavor, but found the port barred to him. He there­
fore went to Keureukon for about six months, before returning 
to the capital where he was seized by Teuku Kali. He was saved 
from execution by the Sultan, who made arrangements for him to 
leave Atjeh. Two days after embarking for Jidda, however, he 
was taken off the vessel in the roads by people from Keureukon.
For two years more, the ’’Aanteekeningen” asserts, Habib agitated 
against the Sultan from Keureukon. He departed for Jidda via 
Simpang Ulim only when it became clear that Panglima Polem would 
not support a march against the dalam,probably in 1868.
17. Grand Sharif Abdullah P^sha (1858-1877) of the Devi or Abadila 
family, which was relatively open to western ideas. Abdullah 
appears to have been unusually interested in the D jawah, as 
Indonesians were known in Mecca, especially for the support they 
might give to his anti-Turkish maneuvers. Zohrab (Jidda) to the 
Foreign Office, London, March 17, 1880 and February 8, 1881,
FO 78/3130 and 3314 respectively; Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1888), I, pp. 168-173; G. de Gaury, Rulers 
of Mecca (London: Harrap, 1951), pp. 249-253. According to 
Turkish government sources, Habib was ’’blood relation” of Sharif 
Abdullah and always visited him when in Mecca. Heldewier to 
Gericke, May 25, 1874, Buitenlandse Zaken (hereafter B.Z.), 
dossier Atjeh.
18. Mouhamar Pasha was the Turkish wali (Governor General) of the 
Hejaz, resident in Jidda. He exercised limited powers in this 
period. Late in 1868, the Porte received a petition addressed to 
Mouhamar Pasha and signed by 65 Atjehnese ’’notables,” which de­
clared that the Atjehnese considered themselves Turkish subjects 
and begged for military protection against the Dutch. It appears 
likely that this petition was inspired by Habib’s visit to the 
Hejaz. The signatories may have been his leading supporters in 
Atjeh. Translations of the petition are in E.S. de Klerck, De
Atj eh-oorlog, pp. 461-462 , and Anthony Reid, ’’Indonesian Diplomacy: 
A Documentary Study of Atjehnese Foreign Policy in the Reign of 
Sultan Mahmud, 1870-1874,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 
Malayan Branch, 42, No. 2 (1969), pp. 75-76.
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With these letters of recommendation, Habib boarded a sailing vessel 
and departed for Atjeh directly.
After anchoring in the Atjeh roadstead, he informed the Sultan 
of his return by letter, adding that the only reason he had come was 
to get his wife Potjut and that he would return thereafter to Mecca.
At this time the Sultan sent two envoys on board to talk to Habib. 
Habib repeated to them what he had written to the Sultan, but he 
also gave them the three letters of recommendation so that the Sultan 
could examine them. As soon as the Sultan realized the contents of 
these three letters, he sent his envoys back on board with instruc­
tions to invite Habib to come to the Kraton. The Sultan personally 
stood on the beach to await him and brought him to the Kraton out of 
fear that Habib's many enemies would kill him.
The Sultan gave him back his former positions as head of religion 
and of the Great Mosque and chief of Tjot Putu. Habib continued to 
grow in the favor of the Sultan and was eventually appointed his 
Wazir (minister). In this role Habib succeeded in bringing more 
peace and order to Atjeh, while the Sultan's revenues increased be­
cause Habib was energetic in raising the basil (tax). The ulbSbalang, 
on the other hand, became increasingly hostile toward Habib. They 
could no longer get to see the Sultan because he always referred 
them to Habib.
Meanwhile, Habib proposed to the Sultan that he allow the Dutch 
into Atjeh to trade and thereby establish a good relationship with 
them. Habib believed such relations were in the interests of the 
Atjehnese kingdom. Before taking a decision, the Sultan wanted to 
know the opinions of some leading chiefs, namely Teuku Kali, Teuku 
Imam Longbata, and Teuku Nek Mara'sa.19
In the discussions the Sultan had with chiefs in Habib's presence 
about this proposal, they fully agreed with Habib, and it was con­
cluded that Habib would go to Batavia with Teuku Kali and Teuku Nek 
Mara'sa as envoys from the Sultan to the Governor-General of Nether­
lands India. The steamship Tatty, and Captain Roura20 were to be 
hired for this purpose. After the chiefs left the Kraton, however, 
they openly said that Habib intended to sell Atjeh to the Dutch.
While these discussions and deliberations were taking place,
His [Netherlands'] Majesty's steamship Djambi arrived at Atjeh roads, 
bringing a letter from the Governor-General of Netherlands India and 
some presents. Habib was deputed to go to the Djambi with Teuku Kali
19. As uleSbalang of territories close to the capital, T. Imam 
Longbata (LuSng Bata) and T. Nek Mara'sa and T. Kali Malikon 
AdS were frequently consulted "court ul^Sbalang." Van Langen, 
("De Inrichting," p. 421) names these three and two others as 
members of a sort of judicial council for Sultan Ibrahim.
20. Captain Edouard Roura, of Marseilles, had been trading in pepper 
between Penang and the West Coast of Atjeh since the 1850's.
He was particularly friendly with Abdur-Rahman, who corresponded 
with him and used his ship the Patty to travel to Penang in 
1872.
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and Teuku Nek Mara’sa.21 When he left the shore, and also later 
when he left the Djambi, he was given a thirteen-gun salute.
The Commander of the Djambi spoke to Habib in detail about his 
mission, with the result that the two other envoys muttered that 
Habib was busy selling Atjeh. When later the Commander came ashore 
at Kota Dalam he held discussions with Panglima Tibang (HabibTs 
enemy).22 On hearing this, Habib was very disturbed.
After the Djambi fs departure the following events occurred. 
Tuanku Zainal Abidin,23 24 son of Sultan Ibrahim Mansursjah, learning 
that his father intended to designate Tuanku Mahmud as his succes­
sor, resolved to murder his father. In fact, he tried to do so by 
firing at his father with a pistol but did not hit him. This con­
flict between the Sultan and his son was patched up by Habib.
Shortly thereafter Tuanku Zainal Abidin died of a short-lived 
but serious illness. Sultan Ibrahim followed his son soon after.21* 
Before his death, however, he made a written will in which Tuanku 
Mahmud was designated his successor and Habib Abdur-Rahman was 
named regent during his minority.
Meanwhile there was disagreement among the uleSbalang about 
the succession. While some wanted Tuanku Mahmud as Sultan, there 
was another party which wanted to see Tuanku Husein,25 the son of
21. Habib?s chronology is confused here. The Djambi was in Atjeh 
roads during September 19-30, 1871, after the death of Sultan 
Ibrahim. The Dj ambi carried a letter from the Governor of Sumatra1s 
West Coast, not from the Governor-General. The basic task of 
Controleur Kraijenhoff, who led the Dutch mission, was to estab­
lish whether Dutch objectives in Atjeh might be obtained peace­
fully. The mission achieved nothing initially, being constantly 
put off by the Shahbandar, Panglima Tibang, until Habib arrived 
from a six-month sojourn on the West Coast on September 24. Two 
days later a five-man Atjehnese delegation was received by the
Dj ambi with thirteen guns. It was composed of Habib and Teuku 
Kali as the joint regents of Atjeh, and three "court uleebalang"-- 
T. Aga Imam, T. LuSng Bata, and T. Meuraf sa. De Klerck, De 
Atj eh-oorlog , pp. 344-349.
22. Panglima Muhammad Tibang had come to Atjeh as a child performer 
from South India, but stayed and became a Muslim. He became a 
confidant of Sultan Ibrahim, who appointed him Shahbandar (port- 
officer) , a post he continued to hold under Mahmud. Dutch 
accounts of the Djambi visit, however, emphasize how completely 
Habib dominated the negotiations and how competently he put the 
Atjehnese case. Only later did the Dutch take Tibang more seriously.
23. Sultan Ibrahim had two sons: Pangeran Hussein, who died in 1869,
and Tuanku Zainal Abidin, who died in 1870. Tuanku Mohammad Daud, 
who succeeded to the throne as a minor in 1874, was the son of 
Zainal Abidin.
24. Sultan Ibrahim died in 1870. His tomb within the dalam is undated.
25. Tuanku Husein was the second son of Tuanku Abas, who in turn was 
the younger brother of Sultan Ibrahim and the son of Sultan Jauhar 
al-Alam (1795-1823). Because of the death of both Ibrahim’s sons,
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Tuanku Abas and grandson of Sultan Mohamadshah, appointed successor 
to the dead Sultan Ibrahim. In the meantime Habib carried on the 
government during the minority of Tuanku Mahmud (one year) as guardian 
of the minor and regent of the state.
At the end of this year Tuanku Mahmud was elevated to the posi­
tion of Sultan26 with the forceful help of Panglima Polem,27 who came 
to Kota Dalam personally for that reason. Habib governed the kingdom 
as Grand Vezir^8 for and in the name of the Sultan.
After another year, when he judged the authority of the new Sultan 
sufficiently established, Habib made a voyage to the West Coast states 
with an authorization or tjap (seal) of the Sultan to levy the hasil.
He succeeded in collecting a sum of $12,000 hasil plus $9,000 which 
was provided by the people for the expenses of the missigit.
Meanwhile the chiefs and people of the XXVI Mukim were still 
disinclined to follow the commands of Sultan Mahmud. They were en­
couraged in this behavior by Panglima Tibang, who bore a great hatred 
for Habib since, having formerly been the adviser of the late Sultan 
Ibrahim, he had lost all his influence on the ruler after Habibs 
arrival. The Panglima even tried to do him to death with poison.
On his return from the West Coast, Habib made use of the money 
he had raised there to force the XXVI Mukim into obedience to the 
Sultan by force of arms. He succeeded in this after marching on 
TjadS with a large army.29
Meanwhile Panglima Tibang continued to make trouble within the 
Atjehnese polity and tried to ingratiate himself with Sultan Mahmud.
To this end he made particular use of Habib’s absence when he went 
yet again to the West Coast.
and the youth of Suleiman’s son Mahmud, the sons of Abas were the 
closest adult males in the line of succession. The older son, 
Tuanku Abdul Medjid, was without support as he was an opium ad­
dict who had fallen foul of Habib.
26. ’’Aanteekeningen,Tt p. 409 , states that Mahmud was declared Sultan 
about November 1870 , Ibrahim having died in July of the same 
year.
27. Panglima Polem was the Panglima Sagi of the XXII Mukim, and as 
such had more men at his command than any other uleSbalang.
28. Habib’s title was Mangkubumi (administrator). Teuku Kali Maliku’l 
Adil appears to have been designated to share the office, though 
in a distinctly secondary capacity.
29. According to ’’Aanteekeningen,” pp. 410-412, this expedition was 
directed against those in the XXVI Mukim who continued to support 
Tuanku Husein’s candidature for the Sultanate. Husein himself 
was living with the uleSbalang of Tjade but fled before Abdur- 
Rahman’s advance. This expedition took place after Habib’s 
return from the West Coast and the Djambi visit at the end of 
1871.
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During this absence His [Netherlands] Majesty's Steamer Maas en 
Waal arrived in Atjeh roads.3® The negotiations which then took 
place were conducted by Panglima Tibang without Habib's knowledge, 
since Tibang had won the Sultan's favor. Such was the state of 
affairs when Habib returned to Kota Radja from the West Coast. Habib 
already realized that war with the Dutch was unavoidable.
Unwilling to share the government of Atjeh with Panglima Tibang 
and unable to exercise any constructive influence over the course of 
events, Habib left Atjeh to return to Arabia.31 He took ship for 
Penang on the steamer Patty, and left from there for Mecca by the 
mail. 2 Having stayed there for some time with the Sjarif, Abdullah 
Basjah, he travelled on to Constantinople. There he was given an 
audience with the Sultan, who received him very well and bestowed on 
him the Commander's Cross of the Osmanie Order. Then he returned to 
Mecca.3 3 3012
30. Habib was absent on the West Coast during a second visit by the 
Djambi in May 1872 and also during the visit of the Maas en Waal 
in late October 1872. Panglima Tibang was also absent during 
both visits, attempting to elicit British support in the Straits 
Settlements. Kraijenhoff, who conducted both these Dutch mis­
sions, found the Atjehnese very reluctant to undertake any discus­
sions in Habib's absence. De Klerck, De Atjeh-oorlog, pp. 364-370.
31. Habib and Tibang appear to have returned to the capital in 
November 1872 to learn that Kraijenhoff had announced an impend­
ing high-level Dutch mission to Atjeh. Tibang had already con­
tacted Schiff, the Resident of Riau, who was to lead this Dutch 
mission during his visit to the Straits Settlements. Without 
consulting Habib the Sultan was persuaded to send Tibang back to 
plead with Schiff for a delay in the mission. Tibang, supported 
by Teuku Kali and the few other "court ulfeSbalang" who shared his 
jealousy of Habib, was no match for Abdur-Rahman in terms of sup­
port in the country. The Arab may have felt, nevertheless, that 
he had lost control of Atjehnese relations with the Dutch at
the very moment these were becoming critical. His departure was 
dignified by a royal commission to appeal to Turkey and other 
European powers for help against the Dutch.
32. A report of January 6, 1873 from Penang stated that Habib had 
left there "on the last mail" for Europe. His intention was 
thought to be an appeal to the French government, which had been 
suggested to him by Roura. Van de Putte to Gericke, March 14,
1873, B.Z., dossier Atjeh.
33. It seems unlikely that Habib could have visited Constantinople 
in February or March 1873 without this being noticed by the 
Dutch at the time or mentioned in the extensive coverage of
his moves after April. Habib had a private audience with Sultan 
Abdul Aziz to present his papers on May 15, 1873. In December 
1873, at the end of his Constantinople mission, he was given the 
the Osmanie Order of the second class. According to Dutch 
sources the higher honor of Grand Cross of the Osmanie Order was 
denied him, as was a formal interview with the Sultan, because 
of pressure from the Western powers, especially Russia.
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On arrival there he received news that war had already broken 
out between the Netherlands and Atjeh and that Sultan Mahmud had 
died.31* At the same time he received a joint letter from the chiefs 
of the three Sagi, in which they gave him authority for a seven-year 
period to negotiate on their behalf with other countries for help in 
the war in which Atjeh had become involved.
Habib accepted this commission, travelled again to Europe, and 
visited Constantinople and Paris,34 5 where he made fruitless attempts 
to persuade these governments to offer assistance to Atjeh. The 
Turkish government promised moral support by sending a letter to the 
King of Holland, though he was later informed by a letter from Murad 
Effendi that Atjehnese affairs were governed by written agreements 
among European governments, so that Turkey did not feel entitled to 
interfere in the war.36
Habib also appealed indirectly for the intervention of England 
by making use of an earlier acquaintance in Singapore with Sir 
Rutherford Alcock,37 who at that time had been Ambassador to China 
and Japan, and now a member of the Upper House.
Because Habib travelled in very great style, the costs were 
considerable; however, the necessary funds were regularly forwarded 
by Teuku Paja of Pulau Penang.38
After making all these attempts in vain, Habib returned to 
Singapore.39 There he addressed a letter to the Governor-General 
of Netherlands India, in which he offered His Excellency his services
34. Holland declared war on Atjeh on March 26, 1873. Sultan Mahmud 
died in January 1874, and it was at his plenipotentiary that 
Habib acted in Turkey.
35. Habib arrived in Constantinople from Suez on April 27, 1873 and 
remained there lobbying very effectively for Atjeh until December 
18, when he sailed for Suez and Jidda. He had intended to visit 
France but did not do so, presumably because his overtures were 
flatly rejected by the French.
36. For the diplomatic outcome of Habib's mission, see Reid, Contest, 
pp. 119-129 and 145-153.
37. Sir Rutherford Alcock (1809-1897) was Britain's first Consul- 
General in Japan (1858-1865) , and Minister-Plenipotentiary in 
China (1865-1871). He took an extended home leave in 1862-1864, 
and probably met Abdur-Rahman in the suite of the Maharadja of 
Johor while passing through Singapore. If Habib wrote to Alcock 
in 1873, however, this appeal does not seem to have reached 
Whitehall.
38. A wealthy pepper trader and ulbSbalang of Tandjung Samuntoh in 
eastern Atjeh, Teuku Paja was in Penang on business at the out­
break of the Atjeh war. His nephew accompanied Habib to Con­
stantinople. T. Paja fell into debt to the extent of $70,000 by 
1874, largely because of his constant support of Habib's extra­
vagant mission. He returned to Atjeh soon after Habib and took a 
prominent part in the war.
39. He arrived by the S. S. Jeddah on March 13, 1874.
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of mediation to restore peace in Atjeh. Habib said that he never 
received any answer to this letter. 0
Habib left Singapore for Pulau Penang1*1 with the intention of 
embarking from there for Atjeh. He stayed in Penang about three 
months, dined many times during his stay with the Lieutenant Gover­
nor, Colonel Anson,1*2 and repeated to the [Dutch] Consul1*3 the writ­
ten offer he had made to the Governor-General.
However, because the government was evidently not then willing 
to negotiate with him, he decided to return to Atjeh and offer his 
help to the Atjehnese in the war against the Dutch. Meanwhile the 
Consul, Mr. Lavino, tried in all possible ways to prevent his going 
there. He had him trailed by a spy wherever he went.
One day he managed to elude the vigilance of this spy. After 
he had cut his hair, shaved his beard, and dressed entirely as a 
Kling [South Indian], he took an unnumbered vehicle in which he rode 
to the beach. There he met the Atjehnese Njak Barun, went with him 
in a sampan to a small steamer preparing to sail to Atjeh, gave him­
self out as a Kling, and booked for Idi without revealing himself 
to anyone on board. Throughout the voyage he pretended to be a 
lunatic. "* “*
When it anchored at Idi the steamer was ordered by a warship in 
the roadstead to avoid any communication with the shore until the 
ship was inspected. At this Habib managed to hail a small Atjehnese 
sampan which was nearby, had himself lowered into it, and put ashore 
at Padawa Pantong. Njak Barun, who had stayed on board, also reached 
Padawa at night and procured for Habib an escort of 50 men, with 
which he set off for Atjeh Besar. In every place he came to--Idi 
Ketjil, Tandjung Samuntoh, Simpang Ulim--honor was paid to him. He 40123
40. Habib's extensive activity in Singapore to promote a Dutch- 
Atjehnese settlement is described in Reid, Contest, pp. 158-175.
41. Habib left Singapore secretly in late November 1874 for Ceylon and 
South India. He resided mainly in Calicut, but appears also to 
have visited Madras and Bombay in the hope of influencing British 
officials. He arrived in Penang from India on May 14, 1875.
Maier to Loudon,December l-, 27 , 1874; January 11, February 9, 23, 
March 8, 1875; ARA Consulaats-archief, Penang,99.
42. Colonel A.E.H. Anson (1826-1925) was Lieutenant Governor of 
Penang since 1867. Anson (About Others and Myself, pp. 324-329), 
recalls his discussions with Habib with delightful vividness.
43. George Lavino had the full-time post of Agent of the Netherlands 
Indian Government for Acheen affairs at Penang, though he became 
Consul in 1881. Anson brought him and Habib together for negotia­
tions against strong resistance from Batavia.
44. On March 7, 1876 Lavino's spies lost track of Abdur-Rahman, who 
boarded the Penang Chinese steamer Batara Bayoo Sree the same 
day. Lavino's account of his movements confirms Habib's precise­
ly, except that his companion becomes Njak Harun. Lavino to Van 
Lansberge, March 16 and 22, 1876, ARA Consulaats-archief,
Penang, 102.
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stayed in Simpang Ulim several days. Radja Teuku Muda Njak Malim1*5 
gave him $5,000 for the costs of the war as well as 500 barrels of 
gunpowder. His force was augmented to 2,000 men. From there he 
went to Kerti [Keureutoe] where his force was again increased con­
siderably and he was given $5,000 by the various uleebalang. In 
Peusangan he received $1,000, in Pidie, $5,000, in Gigi§ng from 
Bintara Kambangan [Keumangan] "*6 $1,000. By the time he reached 
Pidig his force comprised about 10,000 men.
From there, he addressed a letter to the chiefs of the three 
Sagi, notifying them of his arrival and asking whether they wanted 
him in Atjeh with the force he had assembled, and if so in what 
capacity. He received the reply that they were anxiously looking 
forward to his coming. Then he went to Indrapuri, summoned all the 
ulbSbalang of the three Sagi, and put the same question to them in 
person that he had put in writing. They unanimously told him they 
would elect him their commander and war leader. Next he went to 
Missigit Mon TasiSk, called the chiefs together once again, and put 
the same question to them, to which he received the same reply.
Habib then told them he was prepared to accept this commission if 
each one promised obedience to him and if he received an appointment 
in writing signed jointly by the chiefs.
After receiving this commission Habib assumed the leadership of 
the war; however, he still had to contend with the disunity of the 
ulbSbalang, of whom only one section obeyed his orders while another 
section acted entirely according to their own lights without any 
considered plan.
When Habib assumed the conduct of affairs, Kajulah, Bilul, and 
Lambaru were already under the control of the [Netherlands Indies] 
government. As commander he led the Atjehnese against the government 
four times: three times in the XXVI Mukim1*7 and once, the last time, 
in IV Mukim [Lhok Nga]. Before the attack on the [IV] Mukim took 
place Habib tried to persuade the various uleSbalang to submit to 
the government because he was well aware that Atjeh was bound to 
lose out in the war, not only because it was no match for the govern­
ment, but more importantly because there was no unity and his commands 456*8
45. Radja Teuku Muda Njak Malim was the most energetic and successful 
uleSbalang of the East Coast before the war, with the largest 
pepper exports in the country, a small fleet of schooners, and 
considerable investments in Penang. Together with Teuku Paja,
he was the staunchest financial supporter of Habib.
46. Teuku Bintara Keumangan was the leader of the federation of six
ulbSbalang of Keumangan (or Gigieng) in the PidiS district. He 
followed Habib to the war front and seconded his attempts to 
unite the Atjehnese.
48. Kajulah, Bilul, and Lambaru were among the points taken in
February 1876, during the first serious Dutch attempt to extend 
their occupation eastwards of the Atjeh river into the XXVI 
Mukim. Habib reached Atjeh Besar by July 1876, but he devoted his 
efforts to strengthening his own position and supervising forti­
fications in the XXII Mukim rather than initiating attacks. A 
renewed Dutch offensive in late 1876 ended in March 1877 after 
the occupation of most of the XXV and XXVI Mukim. Atjeh Besar 
then remained curiously peaceful until April 1878, when Abdur- 
Rahman began the attacks here mentioned.
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were so badly carried out. Panglima Polem had entirely withdrawn 
from the war out of enmity for Habib,48 and even refused to give 
financial assistance from the money collected from the people for 
that purpose. He let Habib have only a very small proportion-- 
$500.
Nevertheless, the majority of the chiefs were still in favor of 
the war. Habib therefore decided to try to bring the coirflict to a 
decision by attacking the IV Mukim and threatening Kota Radja and 
Uleelheue. 9 But now again the (Radja’s) troops which he called up 
presented themselves in very deficient numbers.
When General Van der Heijden then attacked him from various 
sides he fled to Missigit Mon Tasiek. At this he again assembled 
the various chiefs and urged them to submit; however, they still 
wanted to continue the war. There followed the taking of Sinalob.
The whole Atjehnese army retreated to Missigit Mon TasiSk, and al­
though Habib considered this fortress was strong enough to make re­
sistance possible, this was not to be the case.
Once Missigit Mon Tasiek had fallen into our [Dutch] hands,50 
Habib once more convened a gathering of the chiefs, where he blunt­
ly told them that their cause was completely lost and that they 
would be wise to submit with him to the government. As for himself, 
he wanted to be released from the task with which they had entrusted 
him, because he intended to take leave of them and offer his submis­
sion. Of the twelve chiefs who participated in this meeting,51 seven 
were inclined towards submission, whereas five chiefs still desired 
to continue the war.
48. Polem had in fact withdrawn from the war in 1874 in despair at 
Atjehnese disunity but rejoined it as one of Habib’s leading 
supporters in 1876. The quarrel mentioned here must have arisen 
in 1877-1878.
49. This major operation began immediately after the Dutch commander 
Van der Heijden had sailed for Geudong with a large part of his 
force on June 15, 1878. The Dutch post at KruSng Raba in the
IV Mukim Lhok Nga (West Coast of Atjeh Besar) was cut off and 
seriously threatened until it was relieved on June 25. Habib 
twice offered to allow the 100-man garrison to leave if they 
destroyed their fort. Meanwhile he mobilized some thousands of 
men who put Kota Radja itself in danger until Van der Heijden’s 
return with his men on June 23-24. Habib’s offensive brought an 
end to Dutch passivity. Van der Heijden was reinforced and allowed 
to conquer the whole of the Atjeh valley. E. B. Kielstra, 
Beschrijving van den Atjeh-oorlog (The Hague: Van Cleef, 1885),
n r ,~ p p ; '2T9"-"247 :-------------------------------
50. July 28, 1878.
51. This is probably a reference to the ulfegbalang jang duabelas--the 
twelve ulbSbalang, composed of four from each of the three Sagi of 
Atjeh Besar, who traditionally had the power of election to the 
throne. Abdur-Rahman made a similar statement to Lavino in 1875, 
saying that five out of twelve chiefs of Atjeh Besar were on his 
side. Lavino to Van Lansberge, May 27, 1875, ARA Consulaats- 
archief, Penang 101. These references are among the most striking 
evidence for the strength of the institution which Snouck Hurgronje 
(The Achehnese, I, p. 138) plays down.
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In this state of affairs a letter fell into Habib's hands 
addressed to Teuku Muda Ba'et by the Governor of Atjeh and depend­
encies, in reply to a previous letter sent by the chief to the 
governor. In Teuku Muda Ba'et's absence, this letter was answered 
by Habib, and once the reply was sent Habib wrote himself to the 
Governor. The correspondence which ensued resulted in the submis­
sion of Habib, which took place in Kota Radja on October 13, 1878, 
after the conditions he advanced were accepted.
While negotiations were being conducted between Habib and the 
government he still saw to it that the building of new fortifications 
continued day and night. He did this in the first place so as not 
to be unprepared if the negotiations with the government failed, but 
also to avoid arousing the suspicion of the population. For although 
Habib had informed the ule&balang of his intentions, he had done 
this in such general terms that the submission itself, as well as 
its timing, was unknown to them. Indeed, many perhaps regarded his 
statement as intimidation.
His journey to Aneuk Galong, where he was awaited on the above 
date by Chief of Staff Major Gey van Pittius and Assistant 
Resident Sol, always took place at night, for fear of being hindered 
by hostile elements.52
The above was noted down and put into writing by me as a result 
of various conversations I held with Habib and questions I asked 
him. The native writer Mohamud Arif has assisted me by giving 
information. As far as possible I have taken note of facts which 
I believed were not generally known, but above all I have envisaged 
providing a contribution to the knowledge of the character of a 
man who has played an important role in the Atjeh war.
52. Alexander ("Korte Levensschets," pp. 1019-1020) closes his
narrative with details of Habib's journey to Jidda aboard the 
Curacao in November and December 1878. Abdur-Rahman lived on 
his pension in Mecca until his death in 1896. Although he was 
avoided by most Atjehnese because of what they regarded as his 
betrayal, he still believed in 1884 that he could restore peace 
if the Dutch would allow him to do so. Snouck Hurgronje knew 
him in Mecca (1884-1885), and was obviously impressed (The 
Achehnese, I, pp. 76 and 158-164). In 1886 he was appointed 
Sheikh es-Sadat (superior of the sayyid of Mecca) by the Turkish 
wali Osman Pasha. A month later, when Osman was replaced, he 
was relieved of this office by the Grand Sharif Aun al-Rafiq. 
Typically, Habib responded to this humiliation by withdrawing 
to Malabar for some months. De Vicq to Karnebeek, November 12 
and December 23, 1886, copies respectively in ARA Kol.Kab. Cl3> dossier 6169, and dossier 6170.

